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allow others to ride;' 9 (2) the rider usually has notice, through "No
Riders" signs or common knowledge, that the driver has no authority
to allow him to ride; (3) the injured rider will have an action against
the driver so he is not left without redress;20 and (4) last, but by far
the most important, is the fact that the whole doctrine of respondeat
superior places liability on one individual for the wrongs committed
by another and such a doctrine should be applied with caution and
circumspection.
The problem which has been discussed in this note is indeed very
difficult. It would be impossible to say categorically that either one of
the solutions is wrong, for both can be supported by reason and author-
ity It is clear, however, that the solution adopted and followed by
the Kentucky court, in its latest decisions, is that the employer will
be liable for the injuries inflicted upon the rider by his employee when
they are of such a character as would render one liable to a trespasser.
ROBERT C. MOFFrr
RIGHT OF PRIVACY COLLECTION CASES - LETTER OF
CREDITOR TO DEBTOR'S EMPLOYER
In the recent case of Voneye v Turner,' the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals was confronted with a question arising from the actions of a
zealous creditor in his attempt to collect a debt. The court held that
the creditor could write to the debtor s employer requesting his as-
sistance in the collection of the debt without making himself liable in
an action for the invasion of the debtor s right of privacy
It is the purpose of this note to present the current position of the
courts on the question of the right of privacy in the process of debt
collection, and the extent to which the courts have held certain
methods employed by creditors to be invasions of the individual's
right of privacy Although this note will not cover all acts which con-
"The fact that the act was forbidden does not of itself relieve the master of
liability but it should be considered m determining the scope of employment.
Smith v. Munch, 65 Minn. 256, 68 N.W 19 (1896); Lnpus v. London Omnibus
Co., 1 H. & C. 526, 158 Eng. Rep. 993 (Ex. 1862); TIFFANY, AGENCY 109 (2d ed.
1924).
' The lack of financial responsibility of the servant is usually stated as the
reason for supporting the doctrine of respondeat superior. MECHEM, AGENCY 828
(3d 1923). However it would seem that this consideration should not be as
controlling today as it was when tis doctrine originated, for employees today are
financially much stronger than were the slaves and servants of the eighteenth cen-
tury
'814 Ky. - 240 S.W 2d 588 (1951).
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stitute a violation of the right of privacy, to present a clear picture it
will be necessary to give a brief review of the development of this
doctrine.
During the past fifty years the courts have gradually come to recog-
nize the doctrine of right of privacy as an independent and distinctive
legal concept. This phrase was first introduced by a law review article
in 1890.2 Its origin may be found in the era of "yellow journalism"
where reporters m competition for a story were bound by no code of
ethics, and photographers and advertisers willingly sacrificed private
feelings to increase their individual gains.3 As declared by Warren
and Brandeis "the press is overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and decency" 4 This doctrine has been recognized
by the majority of courts which have considered the question. The
social need for this doctrine did not arise until the tremendous indus-
trial development which occurred in this country, and as stated by
Dean Pound,
"It is a modern demand growing out of conditions of life
in the crowded communities of today."'
Thus in every right of privacy case there exists a judicious evaluation
of two interests: the private right to seclusion as opposed to the pub-
lic right to information which may transcend the individual's right
to be let alone. In determining where the individual's liberty ends
and the rights of society begin, a fine line of distinction must be
drawn.
The first state to consider the doctrine advanced by Warren and
Brandeis was New York.7 In the case of Roberson v Rochester Folding
Box Co.8 the defendant, without the knowledge or consent of the plain-
tiff, printed and circulated about twenty-five thousand lithographic
prints of the plaintiff to advertise its flour. The plaintiff sought, solely
on the ground of a violation of her right of privacy, both an injunction
and damages. In a four to three decision the court flatly deied the
existence of the so-called right of privacy on two principal grounds:
first, that the supposed right was not mentioned by any of the great
commentators nor sanctioned by any precedents, and second, that the
recognition of such right would open up a vast field of litigation.
This decision caused so much criticism that the New York legisla-
ture enacted in the following year a statute giving a cause of action to
'Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HAiv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
3 Pound, Interest of Personality, 28 HAIv. L. REv. 343, 363 (1915).
Supra, note 2 at 196.
138 A.L.R. 22, 28.
'Supra, note 3 at 343, 362.
'Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
'Ibzd.
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one whose name or picture is used without his written consent for
purposes of advertising or trade.9 Unfortunately, however, if the right
of privacy is not given recognition at common law, legislation is not
likely to provide adequate remedy The history of this New York
Statute is a good example.
The statute is narrow and has been strictly construed. Many fla-
grant violations of one s interest may not be considered violations of
the right of privacy, for the court has held that the New York legisla-
ture intended for the statutory cause of action to be exclusive of any
common law right of privacy This interpretation of the statute points
up the chief objection to having legislative action determine the extent
to which one s right of privacy may be protected. Since this doctrine
is a "catch-all" right, it must be flexible enough to meet political, social
and economic changes. As stated by a leading authority on the right
of privacy doctrine, "It is of the essence of the Anglo-American
judicial system that it operates after the fact rather than before." 10
Where there is required a fine distinction between the private rights of
the individual and rights of society "the safe guard of the individual
on the one hand and of the public on the other is the wisdom and in-
tegrity of the judiciary "11 The common law right of privacy doctrine
was originated not as the result of a fixed inherited traditional code,
but was created to meet unanticipated needs. Therefore, it is better
to have new applications of the doctrine depend on the need of sug-
gested new remedies rather than upon the legislative intent to include
the particular act within the statute.
The absence of precedent affirming the existence of the right of
privacy doctrine was one of the principal grounds for this first New
York decision repudiating the doctrine. But the courts which have
since recognized the doctrine have disregarded these objections. In the
first case supporting the doctrine:
"The entire absence for a long period of time, even for centuries, of a
precedent for an asserted right should have the effect to cause the
courts to proceed with caution before recogmmg the right, for fear
that they may thereby invade the province of the law-malang power;
but such absence, even for all time, is not conclusive of the question
as to the existence of the right. The novelty of the complaint is no
objection, when an injury cognizable by law is shown to have been
inflicted on the plaintiff. In such a case although there be no pre-
cedent, the common law will judge according to the law of nature
and the public good'."
9 N. Y. Civil Rights Law sec. 50, 51.2 0Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 89 Micir. L. Rzv. 526 (1940).
'2Supra, note 10 at 526.
1 Pavesich v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, -, 50 S.E.
68, 72 (1905).
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In almost every case where one is attempting to apply the right of
privacy doctrine he will be met with the answer that there is a lack of
precedent for such a remedy, but the courts must judge according
to the law of nature and the public good. If the court believes in
weighing the interests involved that the mjury to individual rights is
too great a sacrifice for the consequent advantages to society, the
doctrine should be extended to protect such interest regardless of
precedent. In the principal case the fact that there is no direct pre-
cedent should not cause the court to hesitate to extend the doctrine to
include the debtors claim. The important question in the Voneye
case is whether the need is so great as to require the extension of the
doctrine to restrict the practice of loan compames reforming the
debtor s employer of the delinquent debt?
Another reason why the court in the Roberson caseis refused to
recognize the right was that to do so would open up a vast amount of
litigation. In the states that have recognized the right, experience
has tended to disprove such a contention. As stated in the Pavesich
case that the fact that such a recognition of a right of privacy would
involve many cases near the borderline between the rights of the in-
dividual on the one hand and the right of the public on the other, and
that numerous cases would present perplexing questions, is not a good
ground for denying the existence of any right or refusing to give relief
in a case where it is clearly shown that a legal wrong has been done. 14
This contention may be presented as a reason why the privacy doctrine
should not be extended to include c6llection cases based on facts
similar to the noted cases. It is the belief of the writer that the courts
of our commonwealth are capable of making "short shrift" of un-
founded and trifling claims, and if the practice of creditors results in
a large number of meritorious claims this would only indicate the need
for a remedy against such wrong. It may be pointed out that it has
never been the practice of our courts to sacrifice the rights of an in-
dividual merely to decrease our courts dockets. One of the recogmzed
objectives of our courts is to protect the absolute and inviolate rights
of the citizens of tis Commonwealth to be "let alone" Is not the
recognized right of a debtor to be free from interference with his con-
tractual obligations made outside the scope of his employment worthy
of protection from an unauthorized interjection of his employer?
There are a number of right of privacy cases from other jurisdic-
tions involving charges that creditors have gone to unlawful extremes
"Supra note 7.
14Pavesich v. Nev England Mut. L. Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 ( ........ ), 50 S.E.
68, 72 (1905).
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m collecting debts. The Supreme Court of Iowa15 affirmed a judgment
awarding damages to a woman for mental pam and anguish, suffered
as a result of receiving abusive and threatening letters. A coal com-
pany to which the plaintiff had become indebted in the sum of $28.75
had placed its claim in the hands of the defendant. Letters written by
the defendant contained threats to sue and to appeal to the woman s
employer, stating: " we will bother him until he is so disgusted with
you that he will throw you out the back door." The court, affirming a
judgment for the plaintiff, said. "A creditor or his agent has a right
to urge payment of a just debt and to threaten to resort to proper legal
procedure to enforce such payment. In this case the jury could well
find that the appellants exceeded their legal rights. "10 (Italics
writer s.) It is of interest to note that the court specifically mentioned
the propriety of threatening proper legal procedure available to a
creditor m the collection of delinquent debts.
The Missouri Courti? has held that the words 'Bad Debt Collecting
Agency printed in large bold type on envelopes mailed to a debtor,
especially when mailed to him in care of his employer, constituted a
libel as tending to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,
or deprive him of the benefit of public confidence.is The court stated
that the act of the creditor was "well devised to attract the attention
of those with whom he was most intimately connected, and without
whose respect and good opinion the life of a sensitive woman would
soon become a burden and unendurable." 19 The Missouri Court ex-
pressly pointed out the more serious nature of the act of the creditor
in mailing the letter m care of the employer.
The question again arose in a recent Louisiana case.2 0 A creditor
who in an attempt to collect payment of a debt of $1.45 due him, sent
a letter to the debtor s employer asking his assistance in the collection
of the debt and threatening legal action m case the same was not paid.
The creditor also enclosed a paper simulating in form and appearance
an official document signifying court proceedings m which the amount
of the debt was erroneously stated to be more than actually due. The
court pointed out that while it was doubtful whether the writings m
question were libelous per se, recovery had been permitted m some
cases on the ground of right of privacy, and held that under the juris-
prudence of Louisiana the acts of the creditor constituted an action-
SBarnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W 25 (1932).
a'Id. at - N.W at 28.
''State v. Armstrong, 106 Mo. 395, 16 S.W 604 (1891).
'Id. at - S.W at 609.
Ibid.
"Quina v. Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558 (1944).
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able wrong. The creditor introduced evidence to show that this was a
common practice of mercantile concerns, but the court stated that this
in no way detracted from the self-evident fact that it is onerous. The
court further stated the letter was "issued with the intention of in-
yoking his (employers) influence and control over the plaintiff
(debtor) as a means of forcing the latter, through fear of discharge or
otherwise, to liquidate the small balance of his indebtedness to it."2 '
The contention has been made in these collection cases that the
purpose of a letter by a creditor to the debtor s employer is not to
coerce, but to write a courteous and friendly letter eliciting the aid
of the employer in "any manner in which he could assist." The ques-
tion immediately arises, by what method does the creditor anticipate
assistance by the employer other than exertion of the economic duress
implicit in an order to his employee to pay the debt? The reaction of
an employer upon receipt of such a correspondence was adequately
displayed in a case which occurred in Nebraska.2 2 The Chief Clerk of
the Nebraska Power Company, who was the debtor s superior, testified
as to the receipt of a letter written him. This letter purported to set
out the transaction between the parties and to threaten garmshment
of the debtors wages. The employer talked to the employee about it
and told hun:
"'Our company won't have men worlang for us who had their salaries
garnisheed, and if in case we had anything like that, we would have
to do one thing or the other, either pay the bills or have to dismiss
him. "M
The Nebraska court m allowing a recovery said, "The distinction seems
to be in all of the cases as between an act or series of acts done wilfully
(sic) and purposely or maliciously and acts which are merely the result
of negligence. 2 4 Although the creditor in this case committed a series
of acts the court stated that "an act" may be suffcient if committed
intentionally.
A Georgia case,2 5 often cited as authority to deny the debtor a
right of privacy action, is clearly distinguishable from the Voneye case
on its facts. It was held that a creditor, by sending a telegram to an
alleged debtor threatening him with legal action in default of im-
mediate payment, was not liable for violation of the plaintiffs right
: Id. at - So. 561.
La Salle Extension Umversity v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W 424
(1934).
Id. at - N.W 425.
"'Id. at - N.M 426.
Davis v. General Finance & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E. 2d
225 (1950).
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of privacy The Georgia courts recognized the rule permitting re-
covery for invasions of the right of privacy but would not permit re-
covery upon the facts, saying: " it is plain that a creditor has a
perfect right to send a debtor a telegram in good faith and threaten
legal action if the default continues."2-6 This case can be easily dis-
tinguished from the noted case on its essential facts. One concerns it-
self with the sending of the communication to the debtor; the other in-
volves the sending of the communication to the debtor s employer.
The Georgia court also stated that: "If these principles did not
apply a creditor would prefer to proceed with legal action without
warning to a debtor in preference to running the risk of being sub-
jected to an action for the violation of privacy rights in the event he
was honestly mistaken in his view that the debt was past due."2 7 This
observation of the court is sound. It certainly would be an unwar-
ranted extension of the doctrine to hold that a creditor could not in-
form the debtor of the existence of the debt and request its payment.
It was also noted by the Georgia Court that the employees of the
telegraph company who were incidentally informed were not alleged
to have been acquainted with the complainant. This is clearly dis-
tinguishable from a case where the information is relayed to one's
employer.
The only recent opmion denying recovery is in the Indiana case
of Patton v Jacob.28 The case is practically on all fours with the
present case on the facts. The complainant was denied recovery, the
court saying: "If a debtor is to have a cause of action for the viola-
tion of his right of privacy merely because his creditor informs his em-
ployer of the facts concerning a valid debt in the hope that such action
may facilitate or even coerce its payment, we consider it more fitting
that such right be created and defined by the legislature rather than by
a judicial decision for which we can find no clear and satisfactory
precedent."29
The weight of the Indiana case as a precedent for the Kentucky
Court of Appeals is somewhat diminished by the fact that the Indiana
court has been reluctant in its adoption of the right of privacy doctrine.
The doctrine was recognized for the first time in 1946,30 and then only
as a basis for injunctive relief in equity The Patton case was the first
time the Indiana court recognized the applicability of the doctrine to
an action at law to recover resulting damages. The Indiana court was
OId. at - S.E. at 227.
' Ibzd.
'118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E. 2d 789 (1948).
0 Id. at - N.E. at 792.
' Mavity v. Tyndall, 117 Ind. App. 291, 66 N.E. 2d 755 (1946).
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clearly in error vhen it stated in its opinion, "There are comparatively
few decisions anywhere, and none in Indiana, in which one s right of
privacy has been held to have been invaded by an attempt of a creditor
to collect a debt."31
The existence of the right of privacy in Kentucky is not doubted.
In fact, this state was one of the first jurisdictions to recognize the right
of privacy as a common law right entitled to protection. It was first
referred to in 1837 by Judge Williams in his dissenting opinion in the
case of Grigsby v Breckznrzdge.3 Soon after the publication of the
Warren and Brandeis article the right of pnvacv doctrine was recog-
nized and adopted by our court when it held that the publication of a
photograph without the owner s consent was an invasion of the plain-
tiff's right of privacy and thus actionable.33 This case was followed by
the typical right of privacy cases concerning the unauthorized display
or publication of one s portrait and public use of one s name.34 The
only controversy which can exist pertams to the limitations of the right
and its scope in particular fact situations. It is of interest to note that
the Kentucky Court was the first one to extend the doctrine to in-
elude a creditor s actions in collecting a debt. In the case of Brents v
Morgan,35 the court of appeals held that a creditors actions in his
attempt to collect a debt could constitute a violation of his debtor s
right of privacy In this case the creditor, a garage owner, exhibited
in his show window a sign, five feet by eight feet in size, which read.
"Notice. Dr. W R. Morgan owes an account here of $49.67. And if
prormses would pay an account, this account would have been settled
long ago. This account will be advertised as long as it remains un-
paid."
The court recognized that a right of privacy existed in this state when
it stated:
"We are content to hold that there is a right of privacy, and that
the unwarranted invasion of such right may be made the subject of
an action in tort to recover damages for such unwarranted invasion."
The correct instructions to be given on re-trial were as follows:
"If the jury believes from the evidence that the defendant, Brents,
either in person or through his servant or employees caused to be
placed upon the front window of his garage facing on Main Street in
Lebanon, Kentucky, the notice set out in the petition and referred
n 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E. 2d 789, 791 (1948).
'2 Bush 480 (1867).
"Foster Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W 364 (1909).
"Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W 2d 972 (1929); Douglas v.
Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W 849 (1912).
"221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W 967 (1927).
'BId. at 774, S.W at 971.
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to in the testimony, and shall further believe from the evidence that
he, or his agents and servants under his instructions, did so for the
purpose of coercing payment of a debt then due plaintiff by the de-
fendant, or for the purpose of exposing the plaintiff to public con-
tempt, ndicule, aversion or disgrace, you will find for the plaintiff. ,a
(sic) (Italics writers)
It is interesting to note that Judge Logan used the disjunctive or in
describing the purpose for which the sign was erected. From this it
may be argued that merely erecting the sign for the purpose of
coercing payment would have been sufficient, without the element of
public contempt. Following this line of reasoning in the principal
case the fact that the letter was sent to the employer would be sufficient
to constitute a cause of action if done for the purpose of coercing
payment.
One of the main contentions in the Voneye case was that the letter
was not sent to coerce. Does this argument seem valid? The letter
was phrased in polite and courteous language, but as stated by Com-
missioner Van Sant in the original opinion on the noted case,
"that which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.""s
In the Brents case the court recognized and accepted the limitations
which were advocated when the doctrine was first advanced by War-
ren and Brandeis.39 The only one of the limitations presented by the
creditor as a defense in the Voneye case is that which holds that the
right of privacy does not prohibit communications of matter under
circumstances rendering it privileged according to the rules of libel
and slander. The nature of a qualified privilege m defamation is set
out m Section 596 of the Restatement of Torts as follows:
"An occasion is conditionally privileged when the circumstances are
such as to lead any one of several persons having a common interest
in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably to believe that
such facts exist which another sharing such common interest is entitled
to knov."
The rule is based upon the idea that one is entitled to learn from
his associates what is being done in a matter in which he has an interest
in common with them. A leading authority expressly stated that such
a letter as found in the noted case was not privileged in the following
terms: " the privilege is lost if the publication is made to a per-
son who apparently is in no position to give legitimate assistance, as
where complaint is made to an employer that his employee will not
pay the defendant a debt."41
' Ibzd.
' See, Opimon Voneye v. Turner, January 30, 1951.
' Supra note 35.
40II RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, see. 596 (1934).
t PRossER, ToRTs 833 (1941).
NoTEs AND CoiNamNTs
The question of whether the sending of a letter by a creditor to the
debtor s employer was privileged under the laws of libel has been
answered.42 On no occasion has the writer discovered a case where
the court has held the communication to be privileged. The primary
reason for denying the privilege is that the information relayed to the
employer was not in response to inquiries made by one who had a
right to inquire. Where the creditors letter brought the complaint to
the notice of the employer," either as a means of inducing plain-
tiff to pay the debt, or for the purpose of causing his discharge, or both
"43 the courts have emphasized this as an additional cause to refuse
to allow the information to be privileged.
In one of the cases where the defense of privilege arose the fol-
lowing information of an employee was included in a letter written
by a creditor to an employer: "Mr. Shiffling owes me on work done
on your dies, etc. $33. If you would consent to retain such amount
out of any money due him from you, let me know by return mail."44
The Indiapa Supreme Court said: "that the letter was not a privileged
communication. The information it professes to contain was volun-
teered, and the purpose for which it was conveyed to the appellee s
employer was solely for the benefit of the writer, and was not intended
to benefit the employer by giving him, in good faith and for a ]ust
purpose, information necessary for his protection against a knavish
servant."45 Applying the rule of the above cases to the Voneye case
it may be reasonably assumed that the creditor-loan company upon
the application of the right of privacy doctrine could not set up the
defense of privilege.
Concluston
The Legislature of our state has passed garnishment statutes by
which a creditor may collect from a delinquent wage-earner, and it is
reasonable to assume that it was the legislative intent for creditors
to resort to this legal process in collecting these delbts.
The purpose of the garnishment statute was to allow the creditor a
remedy with the least amount of economic coercion being imposed
upon the debtor. As a result only a stipulated per cent of the em-
ployee s wage can be taken. But in the case before us the employee
has no legally imposed protective measures, hence all of his wages
can be required by the employer, if he so desires, to pay the debt.
'2 Over v. Schiffling, 102 Ind. 191, 26 N.E. 91 (1885).
" Hollenbeck v. Bistine, 114 Iowa 358, 86 N.W 377, 379 (1901).
"Over v. Sciffling, 102 Ind. 191, 26 N.E. 91, 92 (1885).Is Id. at - N.E. at 92.
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This would place the employee in a position that the legislature did
not intend.
When a financial institution loans money to individuals it must take
every reasonable precaution to safeguard this investment, for the
money loaned is that of the private citizen who had made deposits
with the bank or has stock in the loan company In its efforts to
protect said investments the lender ordinarily requires adequate secur-
ity which will assure its repayment. A loan company that engages in
the unsound practice of lending money without security should not be
"bailed out" by being allowed to coerce payment by informing the
debtors employer of the indebtedness with the polite request at-
tached "would appreciate anything that you can do for me."
While in the early law redress was given only for physical inter-
ference with life and property, there came later recognition of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and is intellect. And "now the right
to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,- the right to be let
alone." There have been tremendous strides made withm the last
fifty years to provide a remedy for those who have been injured by an
unwarranted invasion upon their rights. As is customary there is al-
ways a period where there is no remedy for the wrong because the
wrong must be incurred and recognized before a remedy can be pro-
vided for it.
It is the opinion of the writer that such a wrong exists where a
creditor informs the debtor s employer of the debt, and that a remedy
should be provided by allowing the debtor to have a cause of action
for an invasion of his "right to be let alone." In the expressive lan-
guage of Dean Pound:
"To attempt to compress a developing doctrine within the conservative
confines of prior concepts often stunts its natural growth."8
Wmu#. D=
THE MEANING OF "ONE SUBJECT" IN THE KENTUCKY
CONSTITUTION
The present Constitution of Kentucky, adopted in 1891, like most
state constitutions is so detailed as to render it mcapable of continued
effectiveness in our rapidly changing society without continual revis-
ion. Instead of laying down broad general principles, as does the
Federal Constitution, to be implemented by the legislature and inter-
' 39 Mica. L. REv. 526, 535 (1941).
